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Constitutional Cases 2009:  
An Overview 
Patrick J. Monahan and James Yap* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 13th Annual Constitu-
tional Cases Conference held on April 16, 2010, examines the 
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2009.1 The Court issued judgment in 70 cases in 2009,2 17 
(or 24 per cent) of which were constitutional cases. The majority of the 
constitutional cases (15 of 17 cases) were Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms cases,3 while the remaining two cases dealt with federalism is-
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1
 A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the inter-
pretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 1999-
2009, available online <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/index-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Statistics”]. 
3
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. C. (A.) v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) [herein-
after “C. (A.)”]; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37 [2009] 2 
S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]; DesRochers v. Canada (Industry), [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 8, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 194 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “DesRochers”]; Ermineskin Indian Band and 
Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”]; 
Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant v. 
Torstar”]; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — 
British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“GVTA”]; Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] S.C.J. No. 47, [2009] 3 
S.C.R. 208 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nguyen”]; R. v. Bjelland, [2009] S.C.J. No. 38, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
651 [hereinafter “Bjelland”]; R. v. Godin, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Godin”]; R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]; 
R. v. Harrison, [2009] S.C.J. No. 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”]; R. v. 
Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patrick”]; R. v. Shepherd, 
[2009] S.C.J. No. 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shepherd”]; R. v. Suberu, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”]; Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan, 
[2009] S.C.J. No. 7, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ravndahl”]. 
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sues.4 One of the Charter cases, Ermineskin, also dealt with Aboriginal 
constitutional issues.5 
The release of 70 judgments in 2009 is the second-lowest output in a 
decade (after the somewhat anomalous total of 58 judgments released in 
2007). This reflects what has been a general downward trend in terms of 
the annual output of the Court over the last 10 years. Notably, the Court 
in 2009 also recorded its highest average time lapse between hearing and 
judgment over the same period,6 which suggests a move towards a more 
deliberative approach to adjudication, taking more time to release fewer 
decisions. 
Of the 15 Charter cases, a number of the Court’s decisions broke sig-
nificant new ground, both in terms of the definition of substantive 
Charter rights as well as in terms of the application of the Oakes test7 
under section 1. In contrast, the decisions in relation to federalism and 
Aboriginal issues were less significant, and did not involve any signifi-
cant shifts in the Court’s jurisprudence. We begin by considering the 
Court’s Charter analysis in 2009, focusing on those cases that repre-
sented the most significant departure from previous jurisprudence. 
II. CHARTER CASES 
Six of the 15 Charter claims disposed of by the Court (40 per 
cent) succeeded in 2009.8 After a spike in 2008 which saw an unusu-
ally high 70 per cent of Charter claims succeed, this figure returns 
closer to the average rate under the McLachlin Court, which has al-
lowed 63 of 139 Charter claims for an overall success rate of 45 per 
cent during the decade.  
                                                                                                             
4
 Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chatterjee”]; Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of 
Teamsters, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Consolidated Fast-
frate”]. 
5
 Ermineskin, supra, note 3. 
6
 The average time lapse from hearing to judgment in 2009 was 7.4 months, up from 4.8 
months in 2008. See Supreme Court of Canada, Statistics 1999 to 2009, Bulletin of Proceedings: 
Special Edition, at 4, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/pdf/doc-eng.pdf>. 
7
 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
8
 A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of 
relief under s. 24 of the Charter, or where a statute or other legal rule is declared to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The exception here is 
Grant v. Torstar, which has been included in this category because of the prominent role of the 
Charter in the reasoning, even though it does not technically fall under the criteria set out above. 
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1. Arbitrary Detention/Exclusion of Evidence — R. v. Grant, R. v. 
Suberu, R. v. Harrison and R. v. Shepherd 
In July, the Court released a set of four highly anticipated companion 
cases that brought significant reforms to the law on exclusion of evi-
dence under section 24(2), and, to a lesser extent, on detention under 
sections 9 and 10. Leading this series of cases was Grant. There, a group 
of officers patrolling a school zone in Toronto’s east end engaged the 
accused in conversation while obstructing his path. Upon being asked 
whether he had anything on his person that he should not, the accused 
replied that he had a firearm, at which point he was arrested and 
searched. The accused argued that a firearm subsequently found on his 
person was obtained in violation of sections 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter 
and should be excluded from evidence under section 24(2). 
The question of whether the accused’s Charter rights were violated 
depended on whether his questioning had constituted a “detention” 
within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of the Charter. As the Supreme 
Court had held in R. v. Therens,9 a detention for the purposes of the Char-
ter may be either physical or psychological. The accused here had not 
been subjected to any physical constraint, and so the pivotal question 
became whether he had been psychologically detained. 
The Court took this opportunity to elaborate on the definition of psy-
chological detention. In Therens, the Court established that psychological 
detention occurs where “the person concerned submits or acquiesces in 
the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the choice to do 
otherwise does not exist”.10 However, in Grant, the Chief Justice and 
Charron J. writing for the majority noted that this form of detention has 
eluded precise definition.11 They thus attempted to inject greater clarity 
and precision into the Therens test for psychological detention12 by iden-
tifying three relevant factors to be considered: 
To determine whether the reasonable person in the individual’s 
circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the 
                                                                                                             
9
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
10
 Id., at 644. 
11
 The Chief Justice and Charron J. wrote an opinion that was concurred in by LeBel, Fish 
and Abella JJ.; Binnie J. wrote separate concurring reasons proposing a different approach to the 
definition of “detention” under ss. 9 and 10, while Deschamps J. wrote concurring reasons proposing 
a different test for the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2). 
12
 That is, in the absence of a statutory or other legal compulsion to comply with a direction 
or demand. 
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state of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the 
following factors: 
a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would 
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were 
providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making 
general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out 
the individual for focussed investigation. 
b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the 
use of physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred; 
the presence of others; and the duration of the encounter. 
c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual 
where relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status; 
level of sophistication.13 
This seems a helpful set of factors that provides structure and defini-
tion to the question of whether a “detention” has occurred for Charter 
purposes.14 The analysis is “claimant centred”, in that it focuses on 
whether a reasonable person, in the claimant’s circumstances, would 
conclude that he or she had been deprived of his or her liberty. This ap-
proach seems appropriate given the fact that the question to be 
determined in this case is whether the individual in question has been 
“psychologically detained”.  
Upon applying this framework, the Chief Justice and Charron J. 
found that the accused in this case was indeed subjected to a psychologi-
cal detention and that his Charter rights were therefore infringed; the 
majority then shifted their inquiry to whether the evidence so obtained 
should be excluded under section 24(2). Here, too, they carried out a re-
configuration of the existing law, this time introducing a new test that has 
the potential to significantly alter the landscape on the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Charter. 
In R. v. Collins,15 Lamer J. had identified nine circumstantial factors 
to be considered in determining whether the admission of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Charter would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. He further organized these factors into three 
broader categories: factors relating to trial fairness, factors relating to the 
                                                                                                             
13
 Grant, supra, note 3, at para. 44. 
14
 Note, however, that in the companion case of Suberu, supra, note 3, discussed below, the 
Court divided on the application of the new Grant test on detention, suggesting that the application 
of this framework may still prove to be a matter of difficulty.  
15
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”]. 
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seriousness of the Charter violation, and factors relating to the effect of 
excluding the evidence on the long-term repute of the administration of 
justice. As a guideline, he noted that where the admission of evidence 
would impact the fairness of the trial, the evidence should generally be 
excluded. 
Ten years later, R. v. Stillman16 further developed the analysis on the 
critical but rather enigmatic concept of trial fairness by focusing on the 
distinction between conscriptive evidence (in which “an accused, in vio-
lation of his Charter rights, is compelled to incriminate himself at the 
behest of the state by means of a statement, the use of the body or the 
production of bodily samples”)17 and non-conscriptive evidence (i.e., 
evidence that does not have this conscriptive character). Under this ap-
proach, evidence classified as conscriptive, as well as evidence that is 
“derivative” in the sense that it was discovered as a result of conscriptive 
evidence, was usually said to render the trial unfair and generally ex-
cluded, unless it was otherwise discoverable. 
In Grant, however, the majority noted that the emphasis on trial fair-
ness in the Collins/Stillman framework had unintentionally rendered the 
exclusion of non-discoverable conscriptive evidence nearly automatic in 
subsequent jurisprudence. In their eyes, this appeared incongruous with 
the wording of section 24(2), which specifies that the determination must 
be made “having regard to all the circumstances”. The Chief Justice and 
Charron J. thus implemented a new framework for the analysis of exclu-
sion under section 24(2) that is less categorical and affords greater 
flexibility. 
Under the new approach, the test developed in Collins and Stillman 
has been replaced by a simpler, more fluid balancing test. Now, the gov-
erning test proceeds by weighing three factors: (1) the seriousness of the 
offending state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication 
of the case on its merits. Through considering these three factors, the 
judge must ultimately determine whether, in all the circumstances, the 
admission of evidence would bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute. Meanwhile, many of the factors which had played a prominent 
role under the Collins/Stillman framework are now merely subsumed into 
one of these factors; for instance, discoverability is now an issue to be 
                                                                                                             
16
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stillman”]. 
17
 Id., at para. 80. 
8 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
considered when weighing the impact of the breach on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests. 
In an attempt to provide further definition and clarity to this frame-
work, the majority judgment proceeded to comment on its application to 
different kinds of evidence. In relation to statements obtained from the 
accused in violation of the Charter, the Court reaffirmed the presumption 
that such improperly obtained statements ought generally to be excluded 
under section 24(2). The Court pointed to the fact that the common law 
had traditionally treated statements of the accused differently from other 
statements, and that obtaining statements from the accused in breach of 
the Charter tended to engage concerns over inappropriate police conduct. 
On the other hand, the Court concluded that no such presumptive rule 
should apply to bodily evidence, such as DNA and breath samples. In the 
Court’s view, the taking of a bodily sample does not necessarily trench 
on the accused’s autonomy in the same way as may the unlawful taking 
of a statement. In advocating for a more flexible approach in relation to 
such evidence, the Court signalled an increased willingness to entertain 
the admission of such evidence.  
The Court also elaborated on the factors that come into play in rela-
tion to so-called “derivative” evidence — that is, evidence discovered as 
a result of an unlawfully obtained statement. The Court noted that under 
the previous Collins/Stillman framework, physical evidence that would 
not have been discovered but for an inadmissible statement had generally 
been excluded. The Court proposed greater scope for admissibility of 
such derivative evidence; provided that the evidence is reliable and was 
discovered as a result of a good faith infringement, it is appropriate to 
admit it. On the other hand, where the evidence resulted from “deliberate 
and egregious police conduct that severely impacted the accused’s pro-
tected interests”, even reliable evidence could properly be excluded.18 
Applying this test in Grant, the majority reasoned under the first fac-
tor that the Charter breach was not abusive or in bad faith, but concluded 
that the impact on the accused’s Charter interests (the second factor) was 
significant, noting in particular that the accused would not have been 
searched or detained but for his self-incriminatory statements. However, 
in light of the reliability of the evidence, the majority determined that 
society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, the third factor, was high 
and that the evidence should therefore be admitted. 
                                                                                                             
18
 Grant, supra, note 3, at para. 127. 
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The new approach in Grant significantly shifts the Court in the direc-
tion of favouring the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a 
Charter breach. It also indicates that trial judges are entitled to deference 
in their determinations on admissibility issues. This is important since, 
otherwise, the flexibility inherent in a balancing test could provoke sig-
nificant appellate litigation over the meaning and application of the test 
to the facts of particular cases. While the new approach is not without 
risks (as the Court itself notes),19 on balance this more flexible approach 
avoids the difficulties that had been noted in the previous jurisprudence 
while still ensuring appropriate protection for the rights of the accused.  
The second case in this group was Harrison, in which the accused 
was driving through Ontario in a vehicle registered in Alberta that, in 
conformity with Alberta law (but inconsistent with the law for Ontario-
registered vehicles), had no front licence plate. The police officer was not 
initially aware that the vehicle was registered in Alberta and activated his 
roof lights to pull it over. He then became aware that the vehicle was an 
Alberta-registered vehicle but decided to pull it over anyway because 
“abandoning the detention may have affected the integrity of the police 
in the eyes of observers”. The officer found that the accused’s licence 
was suspended, arrested him and proceeded to search the vehicle (even 
though a search did not seem related to or warranted by the licence sus-
pension.) During the course of this search, 35 kilograms of cocaine were 
found in boxes in the rear of the vehicle.  
The Chief Justice, writing for the majority, applied the new three-
factor Grant test for the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) and 
reasoned that although the evidence was reliable and the offence serious, 
this did not outweigh the seriousness of the police misconduct. Unlike in 
Grant, the police here were not operating in circumstances of “consider-
able legal uncertainty”.20 The police conduct in stopping and searching 
the accused’s vehicle without any semblance of reasonable grounds re-
flected a “blatant disregard for Charter rights” and was aggravated by 
the trial judge’s finding that the police officer’s in-court testimony was 
misleading.21 While the evidence was reliable and the crime a serious 
                                                                                                             
19
 The Chief Justice and Charron J. noted the risk that police may improperly obtain state-
ments that they know to be inadmissible in order to find derivative evidence which they believe may 
be admissible. The Court noted that judges should refuse to admit evidence where there is “reason to 
believe the police deliberately abused their power to obtain a statement which might otherwise lead 
them to such evidence”. Grant, id., at para. 128. 
20
 Grant, id., at para. 140. 
21
 Harrison, supra, note 3, at paras. 26-27. 
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one, the majority of the Court concluded that the police misconduct in 
this instance required that the justice system disassociate itself from fla-
grant breaches of Charter rights and that the evidence be excluded.22 
Suberu, meanwhile, saw the Court split on the subject of psychologi-
cal detention. There, the police had apprehended the accused’s associate 
at the scene of the crime. The accused attempted to slip away unnoticed, 
remarking to an officer as he passed, “[h]e did this, not me, so I guess I 
can go.” The officer, however, followed him outside and said, “[w]ait a 
minute. I need to talk to you before you go anywhere.”23 Analyzing this 
interaction, the majority judgment written by the Chief Justice24 pointed 
to the preliminary investigative nature of the encounter, as well as the 
fact that the officer made no move to physically obstruct the accused, to 
find that the accused had not been detained. The Chief Justice distin-
guished between “preliminary questioning of bystanders” (with which an 
individual is not legally compelled to comply) and focused interrogation 
of a suspect. While the precise dividing line between these two kinds of 
interactions may be difficult to draw in particular cases, the interaction 
with the accused in this case was more in the nature of preliminary inves-
tigative questioning and did not amount to detention. Justice Binnie, in 
dissent, pointed to the actual underlying substance of the words ex-
changed: 
Constable Roughley was replying to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially 
said, “Can I leave?”, by essentially saying, “No”. It was clear to Mr. 
Suberu that he was not free to go “anywhere” and any reasonable 
person in that position would have come to the same conclusion.25 
He would have found a violation of sections 9 and 10(b) and, along with 
Fish J., would have excluded the subsequently obtained statement under 
section 24(2). 
Taken together, these cases signal a modest shift by the current Court 
favouring greater leeway for law enforcement discretion and, conversely, 
a slight narrowing of the scope of applicable Charter protections. The 
Court seems concerned to avoid categorical interpretations of the rele-
                                                                                                             
22
 Justice Deschamps, however, dissented strenuously, arguing that “[t]o acquit someone 
who is charged with trafficking in 35 kilograms (77 pounds) of cocaine with a market value of 
$2,463,000 to $4,575,000 owing to the exclusion of evidence is likely to have a long-term impact on 
the repute of the administration of justice.”Id., at para. 69. 
23
 Suberu, supra, note 3, at para. 9. 
24
 The Chief Justice wrote an opinion that was concurred in by LeBel, Deschamps, Abella 
and Charron JJ.; Binnie and Fish JJ. each wrote dissenting opinions. 
25
 Suberu, supra, note 3, at para. 56. 
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vant Charter provisions which might result in probative and reliable evi-
dence being excluded, even in circumstances where the Charter breach 
might have been relatively minor or incidental. This is certainly an un-
derstandable concern; however, one possible danger with this balancing 
framework is that it tends to involve a significant measure of discretion 
on the part of the trier of fact, which can in turn introduce uncertainty 
and unpredictability into the trial process. It will be particularly impor-
tant for appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, to 
resist the temptation to second-guess the exercise of discretion by trial 
judges on evidentiary questions; otherwise the result will be to increase 
the costs and delays inherent in the criminal trial process.  
2. Freedom of Religion 
The Court handed down two significant freedom of religion cases 
this past year, with the Charter claims in both cases being unsuccessful. 
In the first of these cases, Hutterian Brethren, the Alberta government 
eliminated a regulatory exemption that allowed religious objectors to 
obtain driver’s licences without having their photograph taken. The Wil-
son Colony of Hutterian Brethren challenged the elimination of the 
exemption on grounds that the requirement to have their photographs 
taken violated their religious beliefs. The Hutterite Brethren are a rural, 
religious-based community who believe that willingly having their pho-
tograph taken is a violation of the Second Commandment. The absence 
of an exemption meant that none of their members would be able to se-
cure driver’s licences. They further argued that it was important that at 
least some members of the community be licensed to drive to local cen-
tres to obtain goods and services necessary to the Colony, in order that 
they be able to maintain the rural, semi-autonomous lifestyle integral to 
their social, cultural and religious identity.  
The Court readily accepted that the regulation eliminating the ex-
emption infringed the Colony’s section 2(a) rights and, therefore, the 
focus of the analysis was on justification under section 1. To this end, the 
Alberta government argued that the universal photo requirement was a 
demonstrably justified measure required in order to reduce the risk of 
identity theft in the province (through the misuse of driver’s licences). 
As usual, the Court had little trouble finding that the government’s ob-
jective was “pressing and substantial”. The case therefore came to be 
decided on the proportionality test, and it was here that the Court split 4-3. 
12 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Although there was also some disagreement over the minimal impairment 
step, it was the hitherto little-used third branch of the proportionality test, 
the balancing of deleterious and salutary effects, that became the “deci-
sive”26 factor in Hutterian Brethren. 
The Chief Justice, writing on behalf of Binnie, Deschamps and Roth-
stein JJ., noted that identity theft is a serious and growing problem and 
that drivers’ licences could be and are used for purposes of identity theft. 
A new facial recognition data bank was aimed at reducing the risk of this 
type of fraud, but the effectiveness of the data bank was dependent on a 
comprehensive photo requirement, whereby all valid licences were to be 
associated with a photo in the data bank. The Chief Justice accepted the 
government’s contention that the universal photo requirement conferred a 
“significant gain”27 on the government’s efforts to prevent identity theft, 
and that this was a “pressing and substantial” objective for purposes of 
the Charter section 1 analysis. She also concluded that the limit was rea-
sonably tailored to the pressing and substantial government goal, in the 
sense that any of the alternative measures proposed for consideration 
would have significantly compromised the government’s objective and 
thus were not appropriate for consideration at the minimal impairment 
stage.28  
This represented a somewhat novel approach to the minimal impair-
ment branch of the Oakes analysis. In previous cases, the Court had been 
willing to consider alternatives that may well have compromised the 
achievement of the government’s objectives (while at the same time rea-
soning that the government should be accorded a “margin of 
appreciation” or degree of deference in order to ensure that the existence 
of such alternatives did not thereby result in a finding that the impugned 
measure failed to satisfy the Oakes test).29 Here the Chief Justice clarifies 
that in considering whether there are alternatives to the impugned meas-
ure for purposes of the minimal impairment analysis under section 1, 
only measures that “substantially satisfy the government’s objective” are 
appropriate for consideration.30  
                                                                                                             
26
 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at para. 78. 
27
 Id., at para. 80. 
28
 The primary alternative proposed was a continued exemption from the photo requirement 
for those objecting on religious grounds, with the licence stamped with the words “not to be used for 
identification purposes” id., (at para. 13). 
29
 See generally the analysis of this issue in Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
(looseleaf edition) (Toronto: Carswell), s. 38.11(b) [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
30
 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at paras. 59-61. 
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The Chief Justice went on to consider the final stage of the Oakes 
analysis, in which the Court is asked to weigh whether the overall effects 
of the law on the claimants’ rights are disproportionate, given the gov-
ernment’s objectives. Under this branch of the analysis, the “real issue is 
whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the 
likely benefits of the impugned law”.31 The Chief Justice reasoned that 
the salutary effects of the law were significant, in the sense of enhancing 
the security of the driver’s licensing scheme. She also concluded that 
although the photo requirement would impose additional costs and in-
convenience, it would not deprive the Hutterian Brethren of a meaningful 
choice as to their religious practice. For example, the Chief Justice ar-
gued that the community could hire people with driver’s licences, or 
otherwise arrange third party transport to town for necessary services. In 
this sense, the benefits of the measure outweighed its deleterious effects. 
Meanwhile, Abella J., the leading voice in dissent, took issue with 
much of the majority’s reasoning on proportionality.32 She was less ready 
to accept the government’s assertions that the rule change would help 
prevent identity theft, noting that “[t]here is, in fact, no evidence from 
the government to suggest that the Condition Code G licences in place 
for 29 years as an exemption to the photo requirement, caused any harm 
at all to the integrity of the licensing system.”33 On the other hand, in her 
estimation, the majority opinion understated the harm caused to the Hut-
terites’ way of life, failing to “appreciate the significance of their self-
sufficiency to the autonomous integrity of their religious community”.34 
A review of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hutterian Brethren pro-
vides interesting insight into why the third branch of the Oakes 
proportionality test has tended to be largely ignored by the Court in the 
past.35 The delicate balancing of competing societal interests carried out 
by both majority and dissenting judges reflects the same kinds of broad 
policy questions more typically faced by lawmakers. In fact, it is pre-
cisely for this reason that the courts have tended to focus on those parts 
of the Oakes test that measures the fit between the objective of the law 
and the measures chosen to achieve that objective; although requiring the 
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exercise of discretion by the courts, this kind of means-ends analysis is 
bounded in the sense that it is directed at assessing whether the legisla-
ture’s own objectives are being achieved effectively. In contrast, under the 
final, proportionality analysis of Oakes, the issue is essentially whether the 
legislature made a wise (or, conversely, an ill-informed) choice in enacting 
the impugned measure. There seems little reason to prefer the views of 
judges on such essentially political questions to those of legislators, since 
the judiciary can claim no special expertise in assessing the wisdom of 
political choices by legislatures and governments. It will thus be interest-
ing to observe whether the emphasis placed on the final branch of the 
proportionality test in Hutterian Brethren is taken up in future cases, or 
whether the Court reverts to its traditional focus on minimal impairment 
as the linchpin of section 1 analysis. 
The other significant freedom of religion decision handed down in 
2009 was C. (A.) v. Manitoba. There, the Court upheld a provision allow-
ing a court to order that a child under 16 receive a blood transfusion over 
that child’s religious objections. Section 25(8) of Manitoba’s Child and 
Family Services Act36 empowers the court to authorize any course of 
medical treatment that it considers to be in the best interests of the child. 
Where that child is over the age of 16, he or she has the right to refuse 
treatment unless the court is satisfied that the child lacks the capacity to 
understand the information relevant to the decision or to appreciate the 
consequences of the decision. Where that child is under the age of 16, 
however, no such right exists. 
In C. (A.), the principal claimant was a 14-year-old Jehovah’s Witness 
and Crohn’s disease patient who suffered an episode of gastrointestinal 
bleeding. Medical personnel overseeing her treatment prescribed a blood 
transfusion in order to save her life. When the claimant refused to con-
sent to this treatment, the Director of Child and Family Services 
requested and obtained a treatment order under section 25(8) of the 
CFSA. The treatment was administered within hours and the child recov-
ered. Nevertheless, the child and her parents appealed the order, arguing 
that the provision was unconstitutional under sections 2(a), 7 and 15(1) 
of the Charter. 
Justice Abella, writing this time for the majority, rejected the claim-
ants’ arguments. She agreed with the claimants that “there is no 
constitutional justification for ignoring the decision-making capacity of 
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children under the age of 16 when they are apprehended by the state”.37 
However, she noted that although the CFSA theoretically empowers the 
court to order a child under 16 to undergo treatment contrary to his or her 
wishes even if he or she can establish the relevant mental capacity, this 
does not mean that the child’s level of mental capacity is entirely irrele-
vant to the determination. 
Drawing inspiration from the “mature minor” doctrine at common 
law,38 Abella J. reasoned that the “best interests of the child” standard 
under section 25(8) of the CFSA must be interpreted to accord weight to 
a young person’s views to a degree commensurate with his or her matur-
ity. Such maturity is assessed “a sliding scale of scrutiny, with the 
adolescent’s views becoming increasingly determinative depending on 
his or her ability to exercise mature, independent judgment”.39 Relevant 
factors include the nature, purpose and utility of the recommended treat-
ment; the potential impact of the young person’s lifestyle, family 
relationships and broader social affiliations on his or her ability to exer-
cise independent judgment; and the existence of any emotional or 
psychiatric vulnerabilities. Interpreted in such a way, Abella J. con-
cluded, the court’s power to order treatment under section 25(8) of the 
CFSA was compliant with section 2(a), section 7 or section 15(1) of the 
Charter. 
3. Freedom of Expression 
Two other decisions released in 2009 addressed the right to freedom 
of expression under section 2(b). In Grant v. Torstar, the Court signifi-
cantly modified the law of defamation to provide greater protection for 
communications on matters of public interest. In 2001, the principal 
plaintiff, a major financial contributor to the Ontario Progressive Con-
servative Party and long-time personal friend of then-Premier Mike 
Harris, was seeking various government approvals for a proposed golf 
course at a time when the integrity of the approval process was being 
called into question in the media. The Toronto Star published an article in 
which a local resident was quoted as saying, “Everyone thinks it’s a done 
deal because of Grant’s influence — but most of all his Mike Harris 
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ties.”40 The author had on several occasions sought to interview the 
plaintiff to allow him to address local residents’ concerns, but was  
repeatedly rebuffed. Instead, the plaintiff sued the defendants for defama-
tion. 
Recognizing its duty to, from time to time, “take a fresh look at the 
common law and re-evaluate its consistency with evolving societal expec-
tations through the lens of Charter values”,41 the Court looked to the 
principles governing the protection of freedom of expression under the 
Charter, and specifically “whether the traditional defences for defamatory 
statements of fact curtail freedom of expression in a way that is inconsis-
tent with Canadian constitutional values”.42 The Chief Justice, writing for a 
court unanimous on this point, noted that communications on matters of 
public interest engage the importance of free expression to the proper func-
tioning of democratic governance as well as the search for truth, two of the 
three rationales for the constitutional protection of the right to free expres-
sion.43 However, the traditional defences to defamation, she found, did not 
afford sufficient protection to such communications: 
[T]o insist on court-established certainty in reporting on matters of 
public interest may have the effect of preventing communication of 
facts which a reasonable person would accept as reliable and which are 
relevant and important to public debate. The existing common law rules 
mean, in effect, that the publisher must be certain before publication 
that it can prove the statement to be true in a court of law, should a suit 
be filed. Verification of the facts and reliability of the sources may lead 
a publisher to a reasonable certainty of their truth, but that is different 
from knowing that one will be able to prove their truth in a court of 
law, perhaps years later. This, in turn, may have a chilling effect on 
what is published. Information that is reliable and in the public’s 
interest to know may never see the light of day.44 
In light of this, the Chief Justice concluded that the current law did not 
give adequate weight to the constitutional value of freedom of expres-
sion, and that the high level of protection afforded to the competing value 
of protection of reputation was “not justifiable”.45 
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To address this deficiency, the Court introduced into Canadian defa-
mation law a new defence of responsible communication on matters of 
public interest. To establish this defence, the publisher must show first 
that the publication was on a matter of public interest, and second, that 
the publication of the defamatory communication was responsibly made. 
The second question is to be assessed having regard to a number of fac-
tors including (a) the seriousness of the allegation; (b) the public 
importance of the matter; (c) the urgency of the matter; (d) the status and 
reliability of the source; (e) whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was 
sought and accurately reported; (f) whether the inclusion of the defama-
tory statement was justifiable; (g) whether the defamatory statement’s 
public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than in its truth; and 
(h) any other relevant circumstances. 
Procedurally, meanwhile, the Court determined (Abella J. dissenting 
on this point) that it is for the jury, and not the judge, to decide at the 
second stage of the test whether the publication was responsibly made. 
The new defence of responsible journalism unveiled in Grant v. Tor-
star is a welcome development, as it is likely to foster significantly more 
flexibility in media reporting of potentially defamatory statements. Nota-
bly, while both the English courts and the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
addressed the same issue by adopting a defence of responsible journal-
ism, the defence developed by the Supreme Court in Grant v. Torstar 
protects responsible communication. In an age where the ready accessi-
bility of electronic media for both users and publishers has drastically 
decentralized the nature of public discourse and dissemination of infor-
mation, and resulted in a proliferation of pseudo-journalistic websites, 
blogs and other online sources, a defence of responsible communication 
better reflects the full diversity of public interest statements that merit 
protection from defamation suits. Thus, the decision in Grant v. Torstar 
illustrates the Court’s ability to adapt the common law not only to evolv-
ing Charter values but also to the broad societal changes that often 
accompany rapid advances in technology. 
In GVTA, 2009’s other freedom of expression case, the Canadian 
Federation of Students — British Columbia Component (CFS) and the 
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) challenged a policy im-
posing a blanket ban on political advertising on buses. In a unanimous 
decision, the Court found that the ban violated section 2(b) and could not 
be justified under section 1. In particular, the policy failed to satisfy the 
rational connection test — the transit authorities had sought to justify the 
policy with the objective of fostering “a safe, welcoming public transit 
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system”46 — as well as the proportionality requirement.47 Given the 
skepticism with which courts have invariably viewed blanket bans on 
communications of a certain type in the past,48 this result is consistent 
with previous jurisprudence on freedom of expression and does not break 
significant new ground.  
4. Voting Patterns 
Two-thirds of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions in 2009 
were unanimous, similar to the overall unanimity rate for the Supreme 
Court’s decisions during the year.49 Among those decisions that involved 
a split in the Court, Binnie50 and Fish51 JJ. were the most frequent dis-
senters with three each. Justice Abella registered two dissenting votes52 
and LeBel53 and Deschamps54 JJ. one each. With the exception of 
Deschamps J.’s lone dissent in Harrison, all dissenting votes cast in 2009 
went in favour of the Charter claimant. 
These figures continue some individual voting trends that have 
emerged over the past years. Since 2007, the Chief Justice and Binnie, 
LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. have only registered dissenting votes in Charter 
cases in favour of the rights claimant, while Deschamps, Charron and 
Rothstein JJ. have only cast dissenting votes in the opposite direction.55 
These trends have also continued intact into 2010 thus far, with Abella J. 
dissenting in favour of the Charter claimants in R. v. National Post56 and 
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada,57 Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ. do-
ing the same in R. v. Cornell,58 and Deschamps, Rothstein and Charron JJ. 
combining to dissent in favour of the government in R. v. Morelli.59 De-
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spite these tendencies, however, the fact remains that there is a high degree 
of consensus among the Canadian Supreme Court. There is no evidence of 
any fundamental ideological or jurisprudential divide on our highest Court, 
in contrast with the Supreme Court of the United States, which tends to 
feature much greater division and even apparent acrimony in the opinions 
of the justices of the Court.  
One additional matter of significance is that of the 15 Charter deci-
sions released in 2009, only two were decided by a full nine-judge 
roster.60 This is because the others were heard before newly appointed 
Cromwell J. assumed office on December 22, 2008. Although the cause 
is certainly understandable, it is obviously undesirable for difficult cases 
to be resolved by less than a nine-person bench. With the Court now at 
full strength, it is hoped that the Supreme Court will ensure that signifi-
cant constitutional cases are heard by a full nine-person bench.  
III. FEDERALISM CASES 
As in 2008,61 the Court released just two federalism decisions in 
2009. In Consolidated Fastfrate, the Court was asked to decide whether 
employees of freight forwarding companies were subject to federal or 
provincial labour relations legislation. Freight forwarding companies 
typically operate by organizing individual packages into larger ship-
ments. They then send these shipments to their destinations in other 
provinces using third-party carriers and, upon arrival, the shipments are 
deconsolidated and delivered. In this way, freight forwarding companies 
generate profit by offering individual consumers access to economies of 
scale which they could not otherwise access. The difficulty this arrange-
ment raises, from a federalism perspective, is that no employee of the 
freight forwarding company actually crosses an interprovincial boundary, 
yet conceived at a higher level of abstraction the company’s business is 
to accept a shipment in one province and deliver it to the intended recipi-
ent in another, essentially effecting an interprovincial conveyance of that 
shipment. This raises the question of whether this undertaking falls 
within the exception enumerated in section 92(10)(a) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 (providing for federal jurisdiction over interprovincial  
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undertakings),62 a question which a divided Court resolved in favour of 
provincial jurisdiction. 
Justice Rothstein, writing for six members of the Court,63 drew upon 
historical context, strict textual analysis and jurisprudential authority to 
limit the exception in section 92(10)(a) to those undertakings that physi-
cally connect the provinces through transport. Justice Rothstein noted 
that the freight forwarders’ operations are entirely intraprovincial; while 
they contract with third-party shippers who transport good across provin-
cial borders, the freight forwarders themselves do not physically operate 
interprovincially. Writing for the three dissenting members of the 
Court,64 Binnie J. argued that any historical emphasis on physical con-
nections between provinces was merely a reflection of contemporary 
economic realities that have since evolved, urging his colleagues to adopt 
a flexible approach that accounts for shifting business models and meth-
ods of commerce: 
In an era where contracting out elements of a service business is 
commonplace, the modalities of how a truly interprovincial 
transportation operation “undertakes” to move its customers’ freight 
from one part of Canada and deliver it to another should not contrive to 
defeat federal jurisdiction. Checkerboard provincial regulation is 
antithetical to the coherent operation of a single functionally integrated 
indivisible national transportation service.65 
In Chatterjee, meanwhile, the Court disposed of a challenge to pro-
vincial legislation providing for the forfeiture of proceeds of unlawful 
activity. In a unanimous opinion, Binnie J. wrote that the legislation was 
in pith and substance validly related to property and civil rights within 
the province pursuant to section 92(13). It was thus permitted to exert 
incidental effects on criminal law and procedure, and did not “introduce 
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an interference with the administration of [the Criminal Code forfeiture] 
provisions”66 such as to engage the doctrine of federal paramountcy. 
It is notable that provincial jurisdiction prevailed in both federalism 
decisions in 2009. This is a modest departure from recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence which has tended to favour federal competence. This is 
particularly the case with Consolidated Fastfrate, in which federal juris-
diction over freight forwarders was negated. In contrast, in Chatterjee the 
effect of the decision was to favour overlapping or concurrent provincial 
and federal jurisdiction, which is consistent with the Court’s modern  
approach to federalism analysis.  
IV. ABORIGINAL CASES 
In 2009’s sole Aboriginal constitutional case, Ermineskin, the Court 
unanimously ruled that the Crown’s fiduciary duty did not encompass the 
obligation to invest Indian bands’ money. The claimant bands, who had 
surrendered their interests in the oil and gas under their reserves in order 
for the Crown to enter into arrangements with third parties to exploit the 
resources for profit, argued that the Crown’s fiduciary obligation re-
quired it to act as a prudent investor would, that is, to invest the oil and 
gas royalties in a diversified portfolio. The claim in this case was distinct 
from other breach of duty claims which have tended to argue that the 
Crown, through some positive action, has acted in a manner inconsistent 
with its fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples; here it was the fail-
ure to act (i.e., by not investing the funds so as to earn an investment 
return) that was said to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Examining 
both the text and the “oral terms”67 of the governing treaty, Rothstein J. 
ruled that there was no treaty right to investment by the Crown, and as 
such section 35(1) was not engaged. It was thus open to the government 
to pass legislation placing constraints upon the nature of the Crown’s 
fiduciary obligations with respect to the investment of royalty moneys, 
and this is exactly what Rothstein J. found it had done. Examining the 
governing legislative framework — consisting of provisions of the In-
dian Act,68 the Financial Administration Act69 and the Indian Oil and Gas 
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Act70 — Rothstein J. determined that the Crown was in fact not permitted 
under the legislation to invest the funds, and that it was therefore not in 
breach of its fiduciary duty in not doing so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the Court has increasingly adopted a balancing 
framework for the analysis of Charter rights. A balancing framework 
tends to favour complex tests with a significant number of competing 
factors, which are then “balanced” or traded off against each other. 
Moreover, in such a framework, it is generally considered that no single 
factor or consideration is determinative and, instead, each case turns on a 
consideration of the various factors in light of the particular circum-
stances of the case.  
Certainly the experience of the past year is consistent with this trend. 
Whether weighing the right to be secure from unreasonable search and 
seizure against the “societal scourge” of gun crime71 in Grant, or setting 
off a religious community’s self-sufficient identity against the need to pre-
vent identity theft in Hutterian Brethren, the Court spent much of its time 
in constitutional decisions performing a delicate balancing of competing 
interests. As demonstrated by the new test for exclusion of evidence un-
veiled in Grant, the Court continues to show a strong preference for 
complex balancing tests, as opposed to more categorical approaches. 
Overall, there does appear to be an emerging consensus on what 
might be termed “Charter fundamentals”, that is, the overall framework 
within which Charter analysis should proceed. At the same time, the in-
creasing resort to balancing frameworks with competing factors and tests 
gives rise to concerns over complexity and predictability. In particular, 
given the oft-repeated assertion that various competing factors need to be 
applied in a case-by-case manner and that no single factor is determining 
or controlling, the risk that arises is that the application of complex bal-
ancing tests will produce overly long and complex trials and the 
substantial risk of reversal on appeal. This increases the costs of Charter 
litigation both to individual litigants and to society as a whole. The Court 
needs to be sensitive to these broader cost considerations, which are rele-
vant and appropriate even within the rights-based framework that 
continues to develop and evolve under the Charter. 
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